Although legal practitioners recognise the terminology 'open skies' there is no one accepted definition. The principle aim maybe the same, namely 'to democratise aviation' but interpretation and practice translates through into variances and divisions as to how liberal nations are willing to be. This paper explores the concept and development of 'open-skies' with the intention of questioning whether this hypothesis is a realistic and an accomplishable objective.
transparency in relation to military forces and activities. However, the Treaty was not to enter into force until 2002. The concept was to promote global confidence and world stability.
Civil aviation has continued to bare the brunt of nations' reluctance to concede control of their skies, whether this is solely as a result of a history of a 'world of warfare' is arguably questionable.
Since the end of the Cold War the pace of globalisation has rapidly quickened; and, whilst many industries have been subject to a more liberalised approach, welcoming and embracing the opportunities afforded through foreign investment and ownership, civil aviation remains subject to the reins of government control. 7 Inevitably there remains a conflict of policies -trade vs.
sovereign protectionism, security vs. competition, etc. were also to be significant years for civil aviation development. Commencing in 1992, the US began to negotiate a series of civil aviation relationships with international partners commencing with the first ever Open Skies air services agreement with the Netherlands. This represented an important development in the liberalisation of air transport services from the post-Chicago restrictive model based on the maxim that, 'all commercial international air passenger transport services are forbidden except to the extent that they are permitted.' 9 Whilst it is often viewed that the Chicago Convention 10 created a restrictive economic environment for aviation, specifically air service operations, this premise strictly speaking remains inaccurate. As Bartsch 11 reinforces, despite the initial Conference having two main threads, (i) technical and (ii) economical, consensus could only be reached in respect to the first objective, in reality, the less controversial strand.
Hence it was left to individual International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) States and
therefore political 'will' to mutually exchange reciprocal commercial rights through air service agreements (ASA's), which were separately negotiated outside general trade diplomacy and related agreements. 12 In essence, this lack of political 'will' arguably created the 'the most complicated field of endeavour ever attempted by man.' 13 And, yet, even with these post 1990's 'open skies'
agreements -aviation has not experienced the same equality as is to be found in other cross-border services. Lykotrafiti 14 states that '[s]eventy years after the signing of the Chicago Convention a very different geopolitical, social and economic landscape has emerged.' Whilst this may certainly be true, the reality is that governments are only 'willing' to concede what they wish to in order to aid their countries trade, whilst still importantly, retaining tight sovereign control over what is still regarded as a 'national asset.' The comments made by Bartsch, are equally as applicable today as they were on reflecting on the atmosphere of the 1944 mid-war Chicago Conference, namely, 'the overarching concern of the majority of the conference delegates was maintaining state sovereignty.' 
Aviation: Clinging onto Sovereignty and Control
Defining a sovereign state in itself remains controversial. The terminology 'country' and 'nation'
are words frequently used interchangeably for what political scientists call a 'sovereign' state.
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Historically state boundaries and borders have continued to move and to be challenged, mostly due to acts of aggression, revolution and declarations of independence. National sovereignty is inherently protected; yet, in a globalised world, recognition is accorded to the fact that cooperation and collaboration are essential factors in securing peace and achieving the integration of a world society. Aviation should be viewed as a critical component resulting in such global linkage, which ultimately enhances and develops the concept of globalisation further, in theory, shrinking the world and thus creating international unity. That said, the aspect of international cooperation however also risks challenges associated with sovereignty and hence can lead to the manifestation of state protectionism. Aviation in particular has witnessed such national reticence to liberalise.
The skies may, technically, be viewed as 'borderless' but the ability to freely fly is often restricted by the lack of international cooperation. Just as the skies are protected 17 , so are the airlines that bilateral or multilateral air service agreements (ASA). Published in the European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 4 (2017) 7-42 (Subject to minor changes and formatting upon publication) 7 utilise the air space -inherently, this stems back to the legacy of sovereign supremacy and control.
Lykotrafiti 18 refers to the fact that this principle extends ultimately to 'economic sovereignty' and has culminated in what she expresses 'appears to be the main obstacle to liberalisation' particularly pointing to the nationality restrictions embedded within the air services agreements, the capping of foreign investment in and the restriction of foreign control of national airlines. Whilst Mendes de Leon 19 argues that the global liberalisation regime of the past two decades has ultimately affected the operation of international air transport services also in a more liberalised manner, this has not transferred through into the realms of ownership, where little progress has been made in terms of the ownership restrictions (substantially owned and effectively controlled limitations create a regulatory regime that relies chiefly on sustained market competition for the achievement of its air services goals and is largely or entirely devoid a priori governmental management of access rights, capacity and pricing, while having safe-guards appropriate to maintaining the minimum regulation necessary to achieve the goals of agreement.
22
Taking both these explanations together, open skies could be best described as an intention to democratise aviation, whilst not being uniform in nature, thus questionably not allowing the full aim to be achieved, the process nevertheless, provides a further stepping-stone within the process of liberalisation.
The US Open Skies current model serves to further evidence this by pointing to the fact that one primary objective is the desirability 'to promote an international aviation system based on competition among airlines in the marketplace with minimum government interference and 
US-EU Open Skies -Overview
The composition of the mandates related to the revision of clauses in respect to the ownership and control of airline companies and all matters coming under the 'exclusive external competence of the Community,' and enabled the Commission to negotiate on the basis of the Community's economic and political priorities. The negotiations, particularly with the US, were to be a key development in the democratisation process for aviation services. 
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To date, advancements in respect to these matters have been slow to non-existent and certainly the US has not made any legislative changes in over 5 years to facilitate this advancement of outside investment and therefore more outside influence. So, whilst the agreement did not go as far as the EU had hoped, it did allow airlines to fly without restrictions from any point in the EU to any point in the US. The EU however continues to retain the position that the ultimate objective is to create a transatlantic Open Aviation Area, in the form of a single air transport market between the EU and the US. This would allow for the free flows of investment and have no restrictions on air services, including access to the domestic markets of both parties.
In contrast the aspects related to safety are in the main far less contentious in open skies negotiations with parties having an openly 'shared' aim, which is to make aviation safety for the benefit of all users, after-all it is in no-ones interest to have unsafe travel which would reflect on the airline, the country and the government. 
Source: Eurostat
Since the first Open Skies Agreement the passenger movements between the two nations has consisted of noticeable peaks and troughs ( Currently, as at 8 January 2016, the US lists 118 partners to Open Skies agreements. 
The EU -External Aviation Policy
Since 2005 the EU has applied a three-pillar approach to its external aviation policy 41 (See Table   2 : pictorial pillar system) 
Bilateral air service agreements
• (See Table 3 : Comparison of OAA and Open Skies). However, the intended progression and developments have again not materialised to the ambition initially declared. 
Like the US, the EU remains intent on advancing international aviation opportunities, as identified in the new EU external aviation policy in which it outlined an ambitious policy targeting 47 The term being referred to by P.V. growth market areas (December 2015 49 ). In this regard the EU specifically outlined that it would be pursuing negotiations with other key aeronautical partners, notably identifying China and Japan.
Other identified negotiations were to be conducted with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
States, Turkey, Mexico and Armenia, as well as with ASEAN.
Alongside this, the EU continues also to bring bilateral agreements in line with the EU concept so as to recognise the union as one collective body. By 2015, the EU had concluded 50 Horizontal Agreements, which saw modifications to more than 1000 bilateral air services agreements of Member States with third countries. 50 To this end, "national designation" clauses found within the bilateral agreements is replaced by "EU designation" clauses. This means that the EU carrier established in a particular EU Member State is permitted to fly under the bilateral agreement of that EU Member State with a given third country.
ASEAN
The 
ASEAN's Approach with Dialogue Partners

ASEAN-European Union
64 Article 21 of ASEAN Charter stipulated that in the implementation of economics commitments, a formula for flexible participation, including the ASEAN Minus X formula, may be applied where there is a consensus to do so. 65 Among challenges faced by ASEAN in fully achieving the full benefit of existing liberalisation initiatives are the non-readiness of several Member States to ratify the implementing protocols and the ASEAN mechanism of less autocracy -wholly based on mutual consensus which provide for leeway to non-participation to agreed economic initiatives via ASEAN Minus X Principle. 66 MAAS provided for limited liberalisation which was capped at unlimited third, fourth and fifth Freedom Traffic Rights between ASEAN capital cities and points designated under ASEAN sub-regional groupings of BIMP-EAGA, CLMV and IMT-GT. 67 MAFLPAS allows airlines of contracting parties to operate unlimited third, fourth and fifth Freedom Traffic Rights for all points in ASEAN. The Agreement also allows for multiple designations as well as a double disapproval regime for tariffs to be charged by airlines, support towards fair competition and no restriction on change of gauge. However, ownership and control is still bound by the substantial ownership and effective control regime. MAFLPAS and its two implementing protocols were signed in 2010 and were aimed to be fully 
ASEAN-EU Air Transport Cooperation
Air traffic between ASEAN and the EU has been growing steadily in recent years and nearly doubled over the last 15 years to reach more than 11 million passengers. 
ASEAN-EU Open Skies Arrangements
Following AATIP, both sides recognised and stressed the significant potential for further cooperation in air transport industry. Hence, during the first ASEAN-EU Summit held in 2014, both sides expressed the needs to address a wider range of areas of mutual interest and challenges to both regions, which include the intra and inter-regional integration and market liberalisation and the prospects for further co-operation between the two regions. At the first EU-ASEAN Aviation Summit, held in Singapore on 11-12 February 2014, the EU and ASEAN discussed the possibility of negotiating a comprehensive air transport agreement. Two years later it was said that the ASEAN-EU pact talks were progressing well -with the intention to create a massive liberalised commercial aviation market between the two groups.
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The EU has actively supported ASEAN's endeavour to establish a single aviation market, including through the ASEAN Air Transport Integration Project.
Analysis on the Possible Impacts of ASEAN-EU Open Skies Arrangements
In general, a liberal market between ASEAN and EU is envisaged to increase connectivity between the two regions. However, there is also possibility for the arrangement to be merely another aeropolitical move, which only attempts to achieve agreed rights. Moreover, the possibility for success is hampered by the fact that, whilst the EU has legal personality and has clarified the (iii) Ownership and control of designated airlines.
Market access for third and fourth freedom is not a major issue for carriers of either region. In actual fact, most of the ASEAN and EU major carriers are presently operating direct flights based upon the existing bilateral rights. Horizontal EU agreements have in fact only been concluded with three of the ASEAN nations (Table 2) From the ASEAN perspective, some of the ASEAN service providers rather than expanding services have also in fact been retrenching. 84 One of the possible explanations of this scenario is however, that operations between ASEAN and EU involves long direct flights (more than 10 hours) which often resulted in low yield due to high operating cost. At the same time, airlines are forced to charge a high tariff rate in an attempt to maintain profitable or even a break-even yield, which subsequently translates to a risk to load factor performance. As a result, presently, only a handful of carriers, majority of which are the legacy airlines, operate direct services between both regions. This low connectivity has indirectly facilitated the aggressive penetration of Middle East carriers in the ASEAN-EU market, which connects via their strategically located hubs in between ASEAN and EU. Turkey therefore also remains strategically positioned to capitalise on this market due to its geographical location. The Gulf carriers have also a low tariff advantage, competitive inflight services and products as well as moderate flying hours in connecting ASEAN and EU via their hubs, and as such they are fast taking the market share for the ASEAN-EU segments.
Therefore, third and fourth freedom rights alone may not be sufficient to address these issue. In essence, given the obvious impediments, the development of an ASEAN-EU agreement for open skies seems some way off. ASEAN States in particular need to resolve existing pending internal matters, and, ASEAN needs to first fully liberalise its market internally. 86 Presently, Indonesia and Lao PDR have yet to ratify the MAFLPAS, hence there is only partial market access within the region. This is an important aspect, particularly given that Indonesia contributes to nearly half of the total ASEAN market, based on total airports and population. The disparity of ASEAN nations therefore remains an issue. For example, when Singapore is contrasted with Indonesia, it becomes notable that demographically there are marked differences, both in terms of prosperity and particularly the expanse of their respective networks. Singapore only has one airport and hence has little concerns in relation to expanding market access internally. The failure in first achieving intra-ASEAN solutions will result in a similar network imbalance in relation to the rights obtained from China. 87 This will ultimately disadvantage ASEAN carriers. Unlike the EU, ASEAN's lack of centralised executive and legislative authority has resulted in ASEAN Member
States not needing to (i) commit; and, therefore, (ii) being penalised for this lack of adherence to 'agreed' objectives. Despite having the mechanism of engaging Dialogue Partner in place, the rationale behind this approach does not serve as a sufficient assurance for ASEAN to fully participate as (i) as collective body (ii) to translate the vision through to end results.
Additional, ASEAN would also need to ensure that 'all' ASEAN carriers were ready to comply with all EU's safety, security and environmental standards. Harmonisation of ASEAN's own safety and security standards, immigration procedures and other related bureaucratic processes, will be crucial, firstly, to achieve. Such practices will however be paramount to realise and a crucial stage in ultimately ensuring a competitive and accessible environment for carriers of both with allowing foreign investment into regional air carriers (should ASEAN recognise this prior to an EU-ASEAN agreement) -then the potential is that both regions would benefit from increased connectivity, plus regaining lost traffic from the Middle-East (Gulf) carriers. That said, there is also the risk that if realised, without the US achieving a US-ASEAN agreement, or developing the US-EU agreement to include such liberalisation as investment opportunities above the current threshold and further expansion of traffic-rights (leading to an Open Aviation Area), then an ASEAN-EU Open Skies Agreement would no doubt negatively impact on this favoured relationship.
ASEAN-US
In terms of their approaches with differing foreign States, ASEAN States are unique. ASEAN Member States individually imposed strict bilateral regulations with regional neighbours in an attempt to limit market access by foreign carriers as part of a protectionism approach. However, the approach is completely opposite with States that are geographically located far away from ASEAN. The rationale behind this approach is to encourage connectivity between both States. A classic example is the bilateral relationship between ASEAN Member States and the US.
In general, most ASEAN Member States enjoy a liberal market access with the US; Malaysia, for example, granted seventh freedom rights to the US carriers. However, it is noted that compared regionally these rights are not equally exchanged. Hence, a multilateral approach between ASEAN and US would be an advantageous move which serves as a means to address the disparity within the existing scenarios. In such an instance both collective parties would also be able to extend talks so as to address the ownership issues. Partnership, ASEAN may be willing to relax its ownership limitation with the US but the issue remains as to the U.S's willingness to reciprocate and concede a further percentage, let alone to allow majority ownership. Given the current reluctance of the US to advance this with the EU, this seems somewhat an unlikely achievement.
Conclusion
In truth, in would be fair to conclude that open skies serve as a 'quasi-deregulatory doctrine;' a concept to liberalise, to varying degrees, the restrictiveness of the original restrictive bilateral
model. Yet, the situation is such that bilaterals are still a majority part of the international trading The reins may have been slackened but debatably not to the extent that aviation has become democratised. Whilst the purpose of the open skies agreements remains to eliminate governmental interference regarding international route rights, the number of designated airlines, capacity, frequencies, and types of aircraft that are to be operated on specific routes, there still remains a complicated labyrinth of contracts, subject to variation and importantly, still subject to arguably, government restrictions.
Whilst the EU supranational system has gradually lead to multilateralism and an open aviation space for equal and fair competition within the EU internal environment -similar to that of the US intra-federal system, the EU and US have not achieved the same anticipated conclusion in their Due to the nature of these 1 st and 2 nd Freedoms, most States at the 1944 Chicago Conference were content to endorse these privileges. These are replicated in the second of the Agreements, which sees the introduction of three further privileges of a commercial nature.
The International Air Transport Agreement
Third Freedom of the Air: the right/privilege granted by one state to another, to put down, in the territory of the first, traffic (passengers, cargo, and mail) which comes from the home state of the carrier;
Fourth Freedom of the Air: the right/privilege granted by one state to another to take on, in the territory of the first, traffic destined for the home state of the carrier;
Fifth Freedom of the Air: the right/privilege granted by one state to another, to put down and to take on, in the territory of the first state, traffic coming from or destined to a third state.
Note: There are other freedoms of the air, which have not been added to the Convention annexes and as such, some remain disputed or unaccepted.
ICAO characterises all 'freedoms' beyond the Fifth as 'so-called' because of this, and hence, only the first five 'freedoms' have been officially recognised as such by international treaty.
These are:
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-The Sixth Freedom: whereby an airline has the right to carry traffic between two foreign
States, via its own State. This is therefore considered a combination of the third and fourth freedoms.
-The Seventh Freedom: permits an airline operating air service (entirely outside the territory of the State of registry) to fly into the territory of another State and there discharge, or take on-board, traffic coming from or destined for, a third State or States.
- 
